Department of Mathematics, Florida State University
| Games are mathematical models of strategic interaction, which arises whenever the outcome of one individual's actions depends on actions to be taken by other individuals. This talk will focus on insights gleaned from dyadic (2-player) or triadic (3-player) games. Dyadic games are the most natural choice for studying many aspects of contest behavior; whereas triads are both the simplest groups in which, e.g., eavesdropping or true coalition formation can be studied and the groups beyond dyads in which analysis of games is most likely to be tractable, especially when allowing for intrinsic variation among individuals. The talk will describe models designed to address a variety of questions of interest to behavioral ecologists. Among such questions are these: How widespread in nature is mutual assessment of fighting abilities, aka resource holding potential or RHP? How does inter-individual variation in RHP affect the propensity to share (e.g., food in roller beetles)? What is the function of a victory display (e.g., by song sparrows or field crickets)? Does eavesdropping (e.g., by green swordtail fish) increase or reduce the frequency of aggressive behavior? When should one neighbor intervene on behalf of another in a territorial dispute (e.g., between fiddler crabs)? The talk will show that game-theoretic models have yielded at least partial answers, before concluding with a snapshot of ongoing work and future challenges. |